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ECONOMIC PRESSURE IN SUPPORT
OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS*
Arthur B. Smith, Jr. t
The proliferation of remedies designed to buttress the national
commitment to equal employment opportunity, and the attendant
administrative and legal problems,' have coincided with a rapidly
increasing backlog of employment discrimination claims at the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)2 as well as an
expanding caseload in the already heavily burdened federal courts3
charged with enforcing the rights guaranteed by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 The frustration engendered by the
delays inherent in overloaded administrative and judicial enforce-
ment machinery may result in strikes, boycotts, and other forms of
* This Article is an expanded version of an address presented by the author to the
Federal Bar Association, Pittsburgh Chapter, on May 2, 1975.
t Assistant Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. B.S. 1966,
Cornell University; J.D. 1969, University of Chicago.
' See Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The More
Remedies, The Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1 (1974); Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping
and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 30 (1971); Com-
ment, The Inevitable Interplay of Title VII and The National Labor Relations Act: A New Role For
The NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 158 (1974).
2 The EEOC case backlog has risen from 24,569 in fiscal 1970 to 97,761 in fiscal 1974.
Statement of the then EEOC Chairman John H. Powell, Jr., to House Labor Subcommittee
on Equal Opportunities, 181 BNA DAILY LAB. REP. D-1-3 (Sept. 17, 1974). Preliminary data
for fiscal 1975 show a backlog of 106,700 cases and a projected backlog of 114,300 by fiscal
1977. Report of EEOC Chairman Perry to Senate Labor Committee, 197 BNA DAILY LAB.
REP. SPECIAL SUPP. 12-13 (Oct. 9, 1975). Both case inflow and case resolutions have also
increased. At the current rate of disposition, approximately 56,000 cases in a 12-month
period, about two years would be consumed in relieving the current backlog without
considering new case filings. Id. See also 8 EEOC ANN. REP. 35 (1974); 7 EEOC ANN. REP. 36
(1973).
' The federal appellate courts have experienced a 60.4% increase in total case filings
between 1969 and 1974; for the same period, total case filings in the district courts have
risen 27.2%. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR
UNITED STATES COURTS, 13,120 (1974). See also Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1975, 61
A.B.A.J. 439 (1975); Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch-1974, 60 A.B.A.J. 1193-98
(1974). The efforts of the federal district court in Chicago to deal with the growing docket of
employment discrimination cases by assigning not only pretrial responsibilities but also
authority to render proposed decisions of a substantive nature in those matters are detailed
in TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972), and Flowers v. Crouch-Walker
Corp., 507 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal
Courts, 88 HARV. L. REV. 779 (1975).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-16 (Supp. III, 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Title VII].
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economic pressure in the expectation that self-help will provide a
more expeditious and effective remedy for real or imagined em-
ployment discrimination.
During the term of a collective bargaining agreement which
prohibits strikes, resort to self-help economic pressure by a group
of employees protected against employment discrimination by Title
VII, 5 or by a labor organization representing them generally for
collective bargaining purposes, raises delicate problems concerning
the integration, accommodation, and proper interlacing of the
guarantees provided by Title VII with those of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).6 On the one hand, the NLRA's industrial
peace objectives and the emphasis on settlement of labor disputes
by procedures created as part of the collective bargaining process,
in conjunction with the goal of Title VII to channel employment
discrimination claims away from the arena of economic conflict and
into an administrative and judicial framework for resolution, con-
tend for nonrecognition of an independent right to engage in
economic pressure as an alternative enforcement mechanism. On
the other hand, the delays caused by the administrative and judicial
machinery, the special deference afforded civil rights protest,7 and
a relatively unnoticed provision of Title VII itself-section 704(a),8
which makes discrimination against individuals opposing practices
prohibited by Title VII unlawful-contend strongly for recognition
of such a right.
This Article will first examine Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Organization,9 in which the Supreme Court
considered minority group self-help in the context of the protec-
tions afforded by the NLRA, and rejected, on the facts of the case,
the contention that a proper accommodation of Title VII and the
NLRA required an expansion of the protections afforded by the
3 Title VII prohibits discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (b) (Supp. III, 1973).
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1970).
' See generally H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsr AMENDMENT (1965).
8 Section 704(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof
or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
9 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
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latter to serve the objectives of the former. Emporium's guidance in
accommodating potentially conflicting labor and civil rights policies
and analysis of section 704(a)'s protection for opposition to prohib-
ited employment practices yield the conclusion that the provision
creates no independent right to utilize self-help as an alternative to
the statutory enforcement scheme. This Article then explores the
difficulties in securing injunctive relief against economic pressure,
in support of employment discrimination claims, which is in breach
of a collective bargaining agreement, even if there is not recog-
nized an independent section 704(a) right to engage in self-help
opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII. Finally, the
Article suggests that an appropriate accommodation of labor and
civil rights policies does not justify a general relaxation of tradi-
tional Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 10 prohibitions on
certain types of economic pressure when exerted either by minority
group and female labor organizations or by exclusive bargaining




Emporium presented the Supreme Court with the potentially
conflicting policies embodied in the antidiscrimination prohibitions
of Title VII and the NLRA's protection of collective bargaining
institutions based on majoritarian principles. It involved the prob-
lem of protecting minority group economic pressure during the
term of a bargaining agreement. The particular facts of the con-
troversy before the Court in Emporium limit the direction the case
provides, but it does reveal an outline of the protections of the two
statutes construed together.
The Emporium operated a retail department store and was a
party to a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement exe-
cuted with the Department Store Employees Union, representing
stock and marketing personnel. This bargaining agreement con-
tained an antidiscrimination clause. 1 A grievance arbitration
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1970).
1 Section 21(E) of the bargaining agreement provided: "No person shall be discrimi-
nated against in regard to hire, tenure of employment or job status by reason of race, color,
creed, national origin, age or sex." Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d
917, 920 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nor. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
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mechanism provided for resolution by a joint labor-management
Adjustment Board of "any act" of the company, representative of
the union, or employee "interfering with the faithful performance
of [the] agreement, or a harmonious relationship between the
employer and the UNION."'" In addition, the agreement con-
tained a clause prohibiting all strikes and lockouts during the life of
the agreement.
13
After a series of meetings involving black employees, union
representatives, and the company's labor relations manager, the
union concluded that the company had been ,engaging in racially
discriminatory employment practices and announced a program
for dealing with workplace racial discrimination, which included
pressing discrimination claims in arbitration pursuant to the bar-
gaining agreement. Nevertheless, a group of four minority group
employees was dissatisfied with the union's handling of their griev-
ances concerning alleged discriminatory assignment and promotion
practices and its decision not to strike in support of their claims.
Refusing to participate in the grievance procedure (contrary to
advice given them by the union, state fair employment commission
representatives and others) because they objected to the union's
decision to deal with the grievances on an individual case by case,
instead of a broader group, basis, the group disrupted and walked
out of an Adjustment Board hearing convened at the union's
request, demanding a meeting with the company president. Be-
cause the group refused to give any testimony concerning practices
alleged to be discriminatory, their conduct effectively foreclosed
Adjustment Board consideration and resolution of their claims.
After the company president refused to meet with them, the two
leaders of the group held a press conference at which they de-
nounced the store's employment policy as racist, again demanded
direct dealings with top management, and announced their inten-
tion to picket and boycott in support of their claims. Picketing at
the store conducted by the two leaders of the group and at least
12 Section 5(B) of the bargaining agreement provided in full:
Any act of any employer, representative of the Union, or any employee that is
interfering with the faithful performance of this agreement, or a harmonious
relationship between the employers and the UNION, may be referred to the
Adjustment Board for such action as the Adjustment Board deems proper, and is
permissive within this agreement.
420 U.S. at 53 n.l. Section 36(G) of the agreement provided that if any matter referred to
the Adjustment Board remained unsettled after seven days, either party could insist that the
dispute be submitted to final and binding arbitration. Id.
13 Section 36(A) of the bargaining agreement specified that "[tihere shall be no strike or
lockout during the life of this agreement." The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 180 (1971).
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two other minority group employees occurred shortly thereafter.
Handbills, urging customers not to patronize the store, accusing
the store of being a "20th Century colonial plantation" and a "racist
pig," equating its treatment of minorities with the "slave mines of
Africa," and encouraging all minorities to "take their money out of
this racist store,"'14 were distributed during the picketing.
The company issued written warnings to the two leaders that a
repetition of the picketing or the public statements about the store
could lead to their discharge. When picketing commenced again,
the two leaders were fired. A charge was filed with the NLRB on
behalf of the dischargees alleging that they had been engaging in
protected concerted activities by protesting what they in good faith
believed to be the company's racially discriminatory employment
practices, and that the company's actions in discharging them
violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 15
The National Labor Relations Board, dividing three to two,
adopted the decision of its Trial Examiner, concluding that the
activities of the two minority group leaders were not protected by
section 716 because the activities were in derogation of the bargain-
ing agreement's procedures for adjustment and resolution of
grievances and, more importantly, were designed to require the
employer to bypass the exclusive bargaining representative and
bargain directly with the minority group about the allegedly dis-
criminatory employment practices. The Examiner's reasoning,
adopted by the Board majority, was that to extend the NLRA's
protection to the minority employees' efforts to force the employer
to bargain directly with them about discrimination claims would
seriously undermine the right of employees to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, handicap
and prejudice the employees' duly designated representative in
its efforts to bring about a durable improvement in working
14 420 U.S. at 55-56 n.2.
'" Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151,67
(Supp. 1975), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1970). Section 8(a)(1) provides: "(a) It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]. ... 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
16 Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own ihoosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in section [8](a)(3) . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
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conditions among employees belonging to racial minorities, and
place on the Employer an unreasonable burden of attempting to
placate self-designated representatives of minority groups while
abiding by the terms of a valid bargaining agreement and at-
tempting in good faith to meet whatever demands the bargaining
representative put forth under that agreement.1 7
The majority was careful to note, however, that the evidence failed
to show that the company was engaged in a pattern or practice of
racial discrimination or that the union's efforts to remedy the
alleged discrimination were so limited that it breached its duty of
fair representation, forfeiting thereby its status as exclusive bar-
gaining representative of the employees.18
Concerning the alleged racial discrimination by the company,
the Examiner had analyzed the record, finding one specific in-
stance of allegedly unlawful practices-a supervisor's direction that
one of the group's leaders cut his Afro-American hair style if he
wanted to be promoted to a supervisory position. The remaining
allegations were found to be based on the "beliefs" of the two
dissident leaders or on the "beliefs" of others with whom they had
conversed prior to testifying but after having engaged in picketing
and boycotting, and on an alleged statistical imbalance in the racial
composition of the company's managerial work force-evidence
unconvincing to the Trial Examiner.' 9 No specific findings were
made on the union's duty of fair representation by the Examiner
because the question had not been joined as an issue. He noted,
however, that
[a]ll the evidence indicates that the Union... was endeavoring in
every way available to it under the agreement to adjust any and
all cases of racial discrimination brought to its attention, and in at
least one and apparently two cases had brought about the desired
adjustment.20
Member Jenkins dissented. Relying on precedents establishing
a union's duty of fair representation under the NLRA, 2' he con-
17 192 N.L.R.B. at 186.
18 Id. at 173 n.2.
'9 Id. at 183.
20 Id. at 185. It was also evident, the Examiner continued, that the union "was prepared
to resort to arbitration to enforce its position that racial discrimination in conditions of
employment existed in Respondent's store, and it was handicapped in proceeding by reason
of the four employees' refusal to assist or be represented by the union in the matter." Id.
21 The dissent cited Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), which relied on
the Railway Labor Act cases, Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952),
and Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See generally Aaron, The
Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Railway Labor and National Labor Relations Acts, 34
J. AIR L. & CoM. 167 (1968).
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cluded that the picketing and boycotting of the minority group
were not in opposition to, or in derogation of, the status of the
exclusive bargaining representative because the duty of fair rep-
resentation imposed an affirmative obligation on the bargaining
representative to eliminate racial discrimination. Although suggest-
ing that the union may not in fact have done everything available
to it in adjusting the dissident claims, 22 he reasoned that whether
or not the union breached its duty of fair representation was
essentially irrelevant. Because, in his analysis, that duty required a
union to eliminate racial discrimination, a minority group's self-
help efforts in furtherance of the same goal were not in derogation
of the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative. Con-
sequently, self-help economic pressure by a minority group in
furtherance of the goals the exclusive bargaining representative
was obligated to achieve could not forfeit NLRA protection.
Member Brown's dissent was based on a different rationale. He
concluded that the minority boycotting and picketing was merely
an attempt to present a grievance to the company and thus a right
protected by section 9(a)23 and not in derogation of the rights of
the exclusive bargaining representative.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
remanded.24 Reasoning that concerted activities involving racially
discriminatory practices enjoyed a "unique status" because of the
anti-retaliation provisions of section 704(a) of Title V11 25 as well as
a national labor policy against discrimination,26 the court ruled
that the Board had improperly accommodated this unique right
with the NLRA concept of an exclusive bargaining representative.
Borrowing somewhat from Board member Jenkins's theory that a
union's obligations under national labor policy prevent a dissident
22 192 N.L.R.B. at 177 n.7.
23 Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group
of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present
at such adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
24 Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
26 The court identified this policy in the NLRA as arising from its own opinion in
United Packinghouse Workers Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 703 (1969) (holding employer racial discrimination to violate § 8(a)(1)).
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group's activities seeking to eliminate racial discrimination from
being in derogation of the union's status as exclusive representa-
tive, the court reasoned that allowing protection for dissident
self-help economic pressure would, at most, result in only limited
interference with the principle of exclusivity. The court also noted
that interference with the status of the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative had actually been limited in Emporium because the
minority group had initially resorted to the union for relief and the
union had been working to eradicate racially discriminatory em-
ployment practices, although not in a fashion satisfactory to the
dissidents.
The key to extending NLRA protection to minority group
self-help economic pressure, according to the court's analysis,
hinged on the quality of the exclusive bargaining representative's
efforts to eradicate racial discrimination. The standard the court
directed the Board to apply, however, was not whether the union
had complied with or breached its duty of fair representation.2"
Instead, a much more stringent test was formulated. Self-help
economic pressure engaged in by minority groups would be unpro-
tected under the NLRA, the court held, only if the minority group
had first resorted to the union for assistance, and if "the union was
actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest extent possible,
by the most expedient and efficacious means."28 The case was
remanded to the Board for application of this test to the facts of
the case and for a determination, not reached by the Trial
Examiner or the Board majority in view of their disposition on the
primary issue, as to whether the acts of the minority group in
criticism of the company's employment practices were so "disloyal"
as to warrant withdrawal of the NLRA's protection. 9 Judge
Wyzanski, dissenting from the court's direction that the Board on
remand evaluate the adequacy of the union's efforts in eradicating
discrimination, was of the view that the principle of bargaining
agent exclusivity should be completely abandoned in racial cases
and that minority concerted activity should be protected under the
NLRA regardless of the union's efforts.30
27 485 F.2d at 931.
28 Id. (emphasis in original).
29 Withdrawal of NLRA protection of concerted activity because of acts of "extreme
disloyalty" rests on NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953). The Trial Examiner,
although not deciding the issue, discussed the problem and strongly implied that the
minority group's activities, notwithstanding the possible grave harm inflicted, had not
forfeited the Act's protections. See 192 N.L.R.B. at 184.
30 485 F.2d at 932-41. In support of his views, Judge Wyzanski stated:
What this case involves is a racial issue. Racial issues in our society are, because
1976]
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The Supreme Court, Justice Douglas dissenting, reversed."
Rejecting the lower court's "most expedient and efficacious means"
test for assessing the legality of minority group self-help, Justice
Marshall, writing for the majority, reasoned that creating an excep-
tion to the long-established principle of exclusive representation to
permit minority group economic pressure in pursuit of nondis-
criminatory employment practices was not justified as a means of
promoting equal employment opportunity. Addressing himself to
considerations totally ignored by Judge Wyzanski's complete aban-
donment of the exclusivity principle and the lower court majority's
creation of an exception to its application, Justice Marshall recog-
nized that resort to self-help economic pressure to force bypassing
a contractual grievance procedure and the bargaining representa-
tive could have the effect of dividing employees into competing
camps, 32 thereby diluting the strength of the bargaining unit as a
whole and providing the employer with an opportunity to "divide
and conquer." The likelihood of strife and deadlock, he concluded,
would increase without furthering the elimination of discrimina-
tory employment practices. The Court also found the employer
interest in being free from bargaining on several fronts and the
union interest in not having its strength dissipated by employer
bargaining with dissident groups legitimate and worthy of protec-
tion, and confined the policing of employer and union compliance
with their anti-discrimination obligations to the enforcement
mechanisms of Title VII.
Thus, at least where there is no finding that the union has
of the United States Constitution, because of the history, traditions and aspirations
of our people, and because of the legislation of Congress, most particularly Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., in quite a different
category from other issues presented by a minority in a unit which has selected a
representative in accordance with § 9 of the Act.
"hen the minority consists of non-whites who seek for themselves what
they regard as equality of opportunity, it is to be expected that their position is, if
not hostile to, or at least uncongenial to, certainly not fully shared by, a majority of
whites in the same unit. Even if we assume that the whites are tolerant, nay
generous, their short-term interest is in conflict with the short-term interest of the
non-whites. Nothing-except perhaps a philosophy founded upon long-term
interests--can eliminate that basic conflict. Hence it is essentially a denial of justice
to allow the white majority to have the power to preclude the non-whites from
dealing directly with the employer on racial issues, whether or not this is in
disparagement of the rights of the union representative.
Id. at 938-39.
31 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
32 Id. at 67. The Court recognized that the rule espoused by the employees would have
equal application to all identifiable minority groups in a work force which reasonably
claimed to be victims of prohibited discriminatory treatment. Id. at 65 n.15.
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breached its duty of fair representation, as in Emporium, the princi-
ple of majority rule, premised on pooling of employee economic
strength in an exclusive bargaining representative, mandates a
withdrawal of the protections provided by section 7 when a minor-
ity group exerts self-help economic pressure in support of its
discrimination claims and for the purpose of bypassing the orderly
procedures established by the bargaining representative for resolv-
ing those claims. Although the Court recognized that utilizing the
procedures established by the bargaining agreement could not
preclude subsequent Title VII lawsuits challenging the same prac-
tices contested in the agreement's procedures, it rejected the claims
of the minority group that the union's decision to process griev-
ances on a case by case basis could not adequately deal with
discrimination claims. In the Court's view, individual grievance
processing of discrimination claims might be more effective than
would initially seem to be the case because adverse arbitration
determinations on a case by case basis concerning a discriminatory
employment practice could result in an employer making desired
changes simply to avoid costly and repetitive arbitrations.33
Encouraging, if not requiring, resort to established processes
for eliminating discrimination was not the only policy embraced by
Justice Marshall's opinion. Accommodation of the anti-retaliation
provisions of section 704(a) of Tide VII with the protections of
section 8(a)(1) also supported withdrawing NLRA protection from
the picketing and boycotting involved in Emporium. Justice Marshall
expressed considerable doubt, although he specifically refused to
decide the issue, that section 704(a) protected against anything
more than reprisal for an individual's seeking access to the EEOC
or the federal courts. 34 Even if it did provide a protected right to
picket and boycott in protest against discriminatory employment
practices, it did not follow, he concluded, that a violation of section
704(a) predicated on a discharge of individuals for protest picketing
and boycotting also meant that section 8(a)(1) had been violated.
Section 704(a) rights infringed by such discharges could be vindi-
cated pursuant to Title VII. The argument was advanced that Title
VII procedures, which emphasize utilization of informal concilia-
tion, conference, and persuasion prior to commencement of civil
proceedings, were cumbersome and subject to great delays. These
problems were not a justification for protecting self-help under the
NLRA, he concluded, because they were matters for Congress and
33 Id. at 66-67.
11 Id. at 71 n.25.
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not the Court.3 - Yet Justice Marshall tempered this determination
that the rights conferred by section 8(a)(1) were not expanded by
-whatever independent rights had been created in section 704(a)
with a suggestion that the legislative history of Title VII did not
foreclose the possibility that in some other circumstances the rights
created by, the NLRA and related laws affecting the employment
relationship would have to be broadened to accommodate the
policies of Title VII.36 Finally, in addition to indicating that the
anti-retaliation provisions of section 704(a) might not create an
independent, right to. engage in economic pressure activities in
protest against allegedly discriminatory employment practices, the
majority opinion, in refusing to disturb the Board and appellate
court findings, that the pressure tactics utilized by the minority
group were not merely an attempt to present grievances to the
company but were for the purpose of requiring direct and separate
collective bargaining, determined that, in any event, the right to
present grievances, to an employer independently of the union did
not authorize resort to economic pressure.3 7
Justice Douglas argued in dissent that section 704(a) does
protect economic pressure in opposition to allegedly discriminatory
employment practices and that its mandate should be incorporated
into, section 7 protections. He also contended that because the
policies, of Title VI dictated that the individual not be "a prisoner
of' the union" in connection with employment discrimination
claims, the standard developed by the court of appeals for assessing
whether- to. withdxaw NLRA protections from economic pressure
tactics. utilized by minorities should not have been disturbed.
Traditional Board law that, in absence of an exclusive bargain-
ing- representative, concerted, activity in protest. against allegedly
discriminatory employment practices is considered prima facie
protected has not been altered by Emporium. 3 Also unchanged by
Emporium is the principle that NLRA protection is withdrawn when
S5 Id, at 73. Justice Marshall'also was skeptical of the factual predicate for the cumber-
scmeness, argument made in the case. Id. at 65 n.16.
1 Id ar 73 r26. This legislative history consists of Senator Clark's memorandum which
interpreted the provisions of the eventually enacted Title VII bill as not affecting rights and
obligations under the NLRA and,the, Railway Labor Act and as not denying to any individual
rights, and remedies. which may be pursued under other federal and state statutes. The
memorandum, however, is silent on the question whether Title VI was intended to expand
existing NLRA protections. See 110 CONG. REc. 7206 (1964). See also Hebert & Reischel, Title
VII'and the Multiple Approaches to Eliminating Employment Discrimination, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 450(:1971).
a See Hebert & Reischel, supra note 36, at 61 n.12.
as See, e.g., Washington Serv. Employees State Council, 188 N.L.R.B. 957 (1971).
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concerted activity has as its objective collective bargaining between
a minority group and the employer without an exclusive bargain-
ing representative's participation.39 Moreover, Emporium does not
disturb Board law that when protest falls short of economic self-
help and simply seeks to present an employer with a grievance
raising a discrimination claim pursuant to the guarantees of NLRA
section 9,40 that activity would not lose its NLRA protected status. 41
Emporium does not, however, provide a specific answer to the
question of whether or not protection for concerted economic
pressure by a minority group will be withdrawn when it is claimed
that the exclusive bargaining representative has forfeited its status
by breaching its duty of fair representation. Because the NLRB
and the courts dealt with a record in Emporium in which a violation
of the union's duty of fair representation had not been proven, it
can seriously be contended that if the union had forfeited its status
by unjustifiably refusing to raise and resolve discrimination claims
with the employer, economic self-help pressure by a minority
group would be deemed protected under the NLRA.
The following is a discussion of two of the major issues left
unresolved by Emporium. First, the scope of rights conferred by
section 704(a) is explored to determine whether resort to economic
self-help in protest against alleged employer discrimination may
ever be protected. Second, consideration is given to the question of
whether economic pressure in protest against discriminatory em-
ployment practices and a breach of a union's duty of fair represen-
tation should be privileged regardless of the scope of protection
provided by the express language of section 704(a) and section
8(a)(1).
II
THE SCOPE OF SECTION 704(a)
The guarantees provided by the express language of section
704(a) of Title VII are significantly greater than those provided by
the anti-retaliation provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act,42 the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),43 and the Occupa-
3' See, e.g., NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944). See generally, Cox, The
Right To Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 322 (1951).
40 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
41 See Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists Union, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962). See also
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
42 Section 8(a)(4) provides: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
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tional Safety and Health Act (OSHA).4 4 Section 704(a) protects an
individual from reprisal for filing an EEOC charge or for giving
testimony in Title VII lawsuits, thereby ensuring freedom of access
to the tribunals charged with enforcement obligations in a manner
similar to the protections from reprisals provided by other basic
federal labor statutes. Section 704(a), however, also protects an
individual "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter. '45 The Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) contains an identical protection,
but neither the legislative history of that statute nor the cases
decided thereunder are helpful in determining the meaning of the
phrase.46
... (4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970).
"' Section 15(a)(3) provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person:
(3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an
industry committee.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1970). In addition to seeking injunctions restraining conduct in
violation of the above provisions, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to seek wage
reimbursement for employees unlawfully discharged. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry,
Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960). Section 215(a)(3) also applies to protect assertion of Equal Pay Act,
29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (Supp. 1975), amending 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970), claims. Wage and Hour
Opinion Letter No. 346, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH WAGEs-HouRs ADMINISTRATIVE
RULINGS 30,956 (Apr. 9, 1965).
44 Section 11(c)(1) provides:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about
to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on
behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1970).
'5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Supp. III, 1973). An additional avenue of protection from
reprisals for opposing certain discriminatory employment practices is being developed in
decisions holding that an action may be maintained against private employers allegedly
discriminating against advocates of the rights of a racial or otherwise class-based group or
opponents of racially discriminatory employment practices. Such action would be brought
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
The statute was construed in Griffin v. Beckinridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), to invalidate
conspiracies to deprive any person of equal protection of law or equal privileges and
immunities under law. See, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971); Pendrell
v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (also holding that § 1985(3) supports
a cause of action for sex discrimination). See also Phillips v. Trello, 502 F.2d 1000 (3d Cir.
1974) (refusing to rule that a cause of action for sex discrimination is maintainable under
§ 1985(3)).
46 Section 4(d) provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his
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Even though the express anti-reprisal provisions in federal
labor statutes not dealing with discriminatory employment prac-
tices are not as broad as section 704(a), NLRA, FLSA, and OSHA
provisions have been interpreted liberally. Thus, section 8(a)(4) of
the NLRA goes beyond its express concerns-reprisals for filing
charges and giving testimony before the NLRB-to render unlaw-
ful a discharge for providing Board agents with pretrial state-
ments,47 a discharge condemned specifically by section 704(a).
Section 1 I(c)(1) of OSHA has been interpreted similarly. 48 NLRA,
FLSA, and OSHA provisions protect individuals from refusals to
hire based on their having filed charges or given testimony against
former employers.4 9 The FLSA anti-retaliation provision protects
against reprisals for seeking government assistance even when
there is no employer-employee relationship otherwise covered by
the FLSA; 50 and the NLRA also protects supervisors from reprisal
for filing charges and giving testimony. 51 Under the NLRA, for-
employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discrimi-
nate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any
member thereof or applicant for membership, because such individual, member or
applicant for membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section,
or because such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a
charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro-
ceeding, or litigation under this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1970). There are no reported court decisions construing the anti-
retaliation provisions of the ADEA and the Wage Hour Administrator's Interpretative
Regulations provide no guidance on the meaning of said provisions. See 29 C.F.R.
§§ 860.1-.120 (1974). The legislative history of the ADEA does not aid in interpreting the
anti-retaliation provisions. Neither S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967), nor H.R.
REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), each of which contained the anti-retaliation
language eventually incorporated into the final version of the statute, discusses the scope of
the protection. Floor debate did not deal with the issue. See 113 CONG. REc. 31,249-57,
34,738-55, 35,053-57, 35,133 (1967).
47 See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
48 See Regulations on Discrimination Against Employees Exercising Rights Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1977.11 (1974).
49 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970); see Iowa Beef
Packers, Inc. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Lamar Creamery Co., 246
F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1957). Fair Labor Standards Act § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1970); see
Wage and Hour Opinion Letter, Oct. 21, 1942, BNA WAGE HoUR MANUAL 98:231.
Occupational Safety and Health Act, § 1 1(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1970); see regulations
on Discrimination Against Employees Exercising Rights Under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1977.3, 1977.5 (1974).
50 See, e.g., Wirtz v. Ross Packaging Co., 367 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1966).
51 The protection, however, derives from § 8(a)(1), not § 8(a)(4), on the theory that
reprisal against supervisors for giving testimony or filing charges interferes with employee
protected rights. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 310 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1962); NLRB
v. Better Monkey Grip Co., 243 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 864 (1957).
Section 8(a)(1), of course, protects concerted activities, which, by seeking access to govern-
ment agencies for the assertion of claims pertaining to terms and conditions of employment,
are for the purpose of mutual aid and protection. See, e.g., Peer Enterprises Ltd., 218
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bidden retaliation also includes denial of unemployment insurance
by a state unemployment insurance commission construing the
filing of an NLRB charge under state law as participation in a
disqualifying "labor dispute. '52 Finally, the protection provided by
OSHA prohibits reprisal because of employee requests for job site
inspections or resort to either federal or state agencies authorized
to regulate and investigate safety conditions.53
The EEOC and the courts have construed section 704(a) as
encompassing equally broad protections when access to enforce-
ment tribunals is the interest sought to be served.54 Even broader
N.L.R.B. No. 155, 89 L.R.R.M. 1619 (1975); Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942
(1942) (FLSA claims); MFA Milling Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 614 (1940) (state wage law claims);
Memorandum of Understanding Between OSHA and NLRB, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,083 (1975)
(safety and health claims).
52 Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm., 389 U.S. 235, 236-37 (1967).
3 29 C.F.R. §§ 1977.9-.10 (1974).
4 "Discrimination" within the meaning of § 704(a) occurs when employees are sus-
pended, discharged, denied desirable jobs or hours of work, harassed, threatened, trans-
ferred into less desirable jobs, or otherwise treated more severely than other employees
because they have filed EEOC charges or have opposed practices made unlawful by Title
VII. See, e.g., EEOC v. Midas, Inc., 8 FEP Cases 719 (D.N.M. 1974), Held v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 373 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1972), Francis v. Telephone & Tel. Co., 55 F.R.D. 202
(D.D.C. 1972), EEOC Decision No. 74-133, 8 FEP Cases 698 (1974) (discharge in retaliation
for filing of charge); EEOC Decision No. 74-53, CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6410 (1973) (denial
of desirable job assignment); EEOC Decision No. 71-1620, 3 FEP Cases 814 (1971) (transfer
to a less desirable job); EEOC Decision No. 71-1677, 3 FEP Cases 1242 (1971); EEOC
Decision No. 71-2040, 3 FEP Cases 1101 (1971) (removal ofjob duties resulting in denial of
overtime opportunities); EEOC Decision No. 72-0455, 4 FEP Cases 306 (1971) (assignment
to undesirable work hours); EEOC Decision No. 71-382, 3 FEP Cases 230 (1970) (refusal to
keep letters of recommendation on employee); EEOC Decision No. 71-288, 8 FEP Cases 424
(1970) (harassment, discharge); EEOC Decision No. 70-683, 2 FEP Cases 606 (1970)
(intensive surveillance); cf. Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973)
(addition of requirements that employee punch clock and not work overtime without
permission not reprisal for filing EEOC charge because such actions are required by Wage
and Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, in administration of FLSA).
With respect to protecting access to enforcement procedures, § 704(a), like its counter-
parts, protects access to EEOC agents by those not actually filing charges or giving court
testimony. See United States v. City of Milwaukee, 390 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
(enforcement of police department rule prohibiting communication of official police de-
partment business to anyone except those for whom information was intended with respect
to interviews sought by Justice Department employees investigating and preparing for
discovery in a Title VII action violates § 704(a)); EEOC Decision No. 71-2312, 3 FEP Cases
1246 (1971) (§ 704(a) prohibits reprisal in form of undesirable job assignment to employee
who refused employer demand to give affidavit of questionable veracity to EEOC); EEOC v.
Plumbers Local 189, 311 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Ohio 1970) (suppressing, in a subsequent trial,
stenographically reported interviews of employees concerning the contents of affidavits
submitted to EEOC on the ground that § 704(a) protects employees from the tactic which
was viewed as inhibiting access to EEOC machinery).
Access to other government agencies, such as state fair employment practices commis-
sions, is also protected. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 70-683, 2 FEP Cases 606 (1970). The
protection also extends to prohibiting reprisal because an employee is contemplating filing a
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protection than that included in the basic labor statutes was pro-
vided in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 55 the first appellate
decision construing the provision. There, the court found that the
provisions of section 704(a) extended beyond protecting charge
filings and testimony to shielding "assistance and participation" by
those protesting discriminatory employment practices. 56 An expan-
sive reading of the protection was necessary, the court reasoned,
because the EEOC did not possess enforcement power at the time
the case was decided. Thus, the court held that the section 704(a)
protection against retaliation extended to offensive, malicious, and
false statements that the employer bribed and improperly
influenced federal officers in exercise of their official duties when
made in support of a chaige of racial discrimination filed with the
EEOC. The employer, citing section 8(a)(4) precedents that NLRA
protections were withdrawn from maliciously false statements
made to the NLRB in support of charges, 57 contended that section
704(a) likewise could not protect employees from discharge in
similar circumstances. Holding that "reliance on the [NLRA and
FLSA] for interpretive guidance must necessarily be guarded
because the differences between those Acts and Title VII may well
outnumber the similarities,' 58 the court determined that section
704(a) required balancing an employer's interest in freedom from
damage caused by maliciously libelous statements against an em-
charge. See EEOC Decision No. 71-2338, 3 FEP Cases 1249 (1971); cf Hoover Design Corp.
v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1968) (suggesting that a comparable protection does not
exist under NLRA § 8(a)(4)). Section 704(a) protects against an employer's refusal to hire an
individual because of the filing of charges against the prospective or a former employer. See
Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1972); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 3 FEP Cases 1217 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1972); Stebbins v.
Keystone Ins. Co., 2 FEP Cases 861 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 481 F.2d 501 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); EEOC Decision No. 71-460, 3 FEP Cases 95 (1970).
An employer must be aware that a person has indeed sought access to enforcement
machinery or otherwise made opposition known before § 704(a) is applicable. See Goodyear
v. Gates Rubber Co., 6 FEP Cases 745 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd, 8 FEP Cases 1007 (10th Cir.
1974). Finally, the EEOC has taken the position that "unconscious" opposition-that type of
behavior which the charging party is not aware constitutes opposition but which is so
interpreted by the employer-is also protected by § 704(a). EEOC Decision No. 71-345, 2
FEP Cases 1083 (1971). For general discussion of § 704(a) and its protections, see Spurlock,
Proscribing Retaliation Under Title VII, 8 IND. L. REv. 453 (1975).
55 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
56 But cf. Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (rejecting
contentions that § 704(a) protected a white employee's freedom to associate with blacks).
57 411 F.2d at 1006 n.19; see, e.g., Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.
1966); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 333 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1964); Walls Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.
1962). See also Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
58 411 F.2d at 1006 (footnote omitted).
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ployee's interest in freedom from racial and other discrimination.
The court struck the balance in favor of the employee because the
statutorily-required confidentiality of EEOC proceedings was re-
garded as sufficient protection of the employer's interest.59
The expansive protection endorsed by the court in Pettway has
been the foundation of EEOC efforts to extend further the scope
of section 704(a) and infuse meaning into the language barring
discrimination "because [an employee] has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. ' 60
Thus, protection against reprisal for "opposition" has been provided
when an individual was discharged after expressing displeasure at
a supervisor's alleged sex-based harassment 6' as well as when an
individual's protesting against a supervisor's reprimand of two em-
ployees for failing to attend an employer's weekly devotional meet-
ing was the cause of discharge.62 Protected opposition has also been
held to privilege a refusal to take tests which had not been vali-
dated in accordance with the EEOC Testing Guidelines where the
particular testing being performed, although not to allocate job
assignments, was for the purpose of gathering data for a validation
study not sanctioned by the Guidelines. 63 Where an employee's or
prospective employee's opposition has taken the form of participa-
tion in peaceful civil rights demonstrations, a refusal to hire or a
discharge for that reason violates section 704(a).64 A discharge
because an employee sought the assistance of a local NAACP
chapter to express opposition on the employee's behalf has also
been ruled prohibited. 65 Finally, when a minority group sought to
elect one of its own members as a union officer (an activity opposed
by the union), his discharge for campaigning was viewed as a
violation of section 704(a) on the ground that his and the minority
group's activities on his behalf constituted protected "opposition. '66
59 One court has determined that the protection for unfounded accusations established
by Pettway extends only to those accusations made in connection with the filing of formal
charges of employment discrimination and does not render unlawful a discharge for baseless
accusations of racism made in the absence of recourse to the EEOC's processes. EEOC v. C &
D Sportswear Corp., 10 FEP Cases 1131 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
60 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
61 EEOC Decision No. 74-93, 8 FEP Cases 419 (1974).
62 EEOC Decision No. 72-0528, 4 FEP Cases 434 (1971).
63 EEOC Decision No. 74-33, CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6406 (1973).
64 EEOC Decision No. 71-1850, CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6245 (1971); EEOC Decision
No. 70-02, CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6023 (1969).
65 Johnson v. Lillie Rubin Affiliates, Inc., 5 FEP Cases 547 (M.D. Tenn. 1973).
66 EEOC Decision No. 71-1544, CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6229 (1971). Apparently mere
membership in an organization that opposes practices made unlawful by Title VII will not
alone bring into play the protections of section 704(a) on behalf of an individual who has not
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Certain types of self-help economic pressure on the job have
also been included within the scope of "opposition" protected by
section 704(a). A refusal to speed up work on the employer's order,
contemporaneous with a protest of alleged discriminatory em-
ployment practices, has been held immune from discharge action
because done in connection with "opposition. '6 7 The establishment
of a one-man picket line during working time in protest of alleged
discriminatory practices against blacks has also been deemed per-
missible opposition under section 704(a).68 The EEOC reasoned
that the right conferred by section 704(a) could not be diminished
by a collective bargaining agreement and was analogous to the
right conferred by Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,6 9 privileging a
strike in protest of serious employer unfair labor practices despite a
seemingly all-encompassing no-strike clause.
The right of "opposition" to unlawful employment practices
privileged by section 704(a) is dearly not absolute. In McDonnell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green,7 0 Green claimed that his participation in a
"stall-in," in which he and other employees stopped their cars
during a morning rush hour along roads leading to company
facilities and blocked access thereto,71 was "opposition" against
otherwise expressed "opposition" for which the claimed retaliation has occurred. See Bal-
deras v. La Casita Farms, Inc., 500 F.2d 195, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1974).
67 EEOC Decision No. 71-2374, CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6260 (1971).
68 EEOC Decision No. 71-1804, CCH EEOC DECISIONS 6264 (1971), cited by Justice
Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Emporium. 420 U.S. at 74. The striker was actually a
white employee who was under suspension for alleged nonproductivity.
69 350 U.S. 270 (1956). The Mastro Plastics analogy is more fully discussed in note 93
and accompanying text infra. The Department of Labor has construed the somewhat
different privilege provided by the OSHA and protecting the "exercise" by employees on
behalf of themselves or others of "any right" afforded by the statute as not ordinarily
entitling employees to walk off the job because of potentially unsafe conditions at the
workplace. Corrections of unsafe conditions are to be secured through the agencies possess-
ing authority to require compliance with safety regulations. On those occasions where an
employee is confronted with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting
himself to serious harm or death, the condition causing apprehension of death or injury
must be of such a nature that a reasonable person would conclude that a real danger exists,
there must be no reasonable alternative to nonperformance as well as insufficient time to
eliminate the danger by resort to regular statutory enforcement procedures, and the
employee, where possible, must also have sought from his employer, and been unable to
obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1977.12(b)(1), (2) (1974). Cf
Labor Management Relations Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970), providing that a refusal to
work because of abnormally dangerous working conditions shall not be deemed a strike.
70 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
71 The protest activities also included a "lock in" demonstration whereby one civil rights
organization with which Green had been associated chained and padlocked the front
entrance of a downtown office building which housed some of the company's offices, thereby
preventing ingress and egress. The trial court concluded that Green had actively partici-
pated in this activity as well, which was also beyond the protections of § 704(a). Green v.
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alleged unlawful employment practices protected by section 704(a).
The trial and appellate courts both rejected such a broad interpre-
tation of the rights conferred by section 704(a) in initially determin-
ing that the company's refusal to rehire Green after a layoff for
legitimate economic reasons was not unlawful.72 Although the
section 704(a) issue was not before the Court,73 Justice Powell, for a
unanimous Court, noted that "[n]othing in Title VII compels an
employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in . . .
deliberate, unlawful activity against it.''74 On remand,75 the trial
court dealt only with the issue of whether the reason for refusing
to rehire Green after his layoff was a pretext, masking an underly-
ing discriminatory motivation. The court ruled that the company
had violated neither section 703(a), which prohibits discrimination
against individuals because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, nor section 704(a), finding that the refusal to rehire
Green was based solely on his participation in "stall in" and "lock
in" activities made illegal by state law. 76
This limitation on the scope of protected self-help "opposition"
when valid state interests conflict with economic pressure suggests
that the role of section 704(a) in the framework of Title VII, as well
as Title VII's relationship to the structure of labor relations regula-
tion generally, must be assessed to determine whether or not
section 704(a) should be interpreted to extend protection to "op-
position" involving resort to economic pressure.
Although the literal language of section 704(a) could be con-
strued, as the EEOC has already suggested, 77 to include economic
McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 851 (E.D. Mo. 1970). The court of appeals
determined, however, that the record did not support a finding of Green's active coopera-
tion in the "lock in." 463 F.2d at 341.
72 Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mo. 1970), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972). The appellate court did not directly reach the
merits of the race discrimination charge since it ruled that the time limitation for filing
charges had run.
73 Green did not seek review of the appellate court's determination that the "stall in"
activities were not protected by § 704(a). 411 U.S. at 797 n.6.
74 Id. at 803. The court of appeals had put it as follows: "[L]awful protest also
commands the same protection [referring to protection from retaliation for filing complaints
with the EEOC], but we find no suggestion that protection extends to activities which run
afoul of the law." 463 F.2d at 341. The Supreme Court reserved judgment on whether
unlawful activity not directed against the particular employer would be legitimate justifica-
tion for a refusal to hire under Title VII. 411 U.S. at 803 n.17.
75 The Supreme Court determined that the trial court had erred in determining the
order and allocation of proof in a Title VII case and remanded for a new trial conducted in
accordance with the standards articulated in the Court's opinion. 411 U.S. at 800-07.
76 Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 390 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
77 See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
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pressure, little guidance has been provided on whether protected
"opposition" depends upon the meritoriousness of the discrimina-
tion claims asserted.78 Because the protection afforded for access to
enforcement tribunals has not been contingent upon the presenta-
tion of a meritorious claim, and protection has been provided even
when the claims are patently false,79 requiring such a condition in
connection with the protection for "opposition" might not be
consistent with the treatment given the rights of access permitted
by other clauses of the section. However, since the right of "opposi-
tion" is really quite different from the right of access protected by
section 704(a), the policy justification for providing enforcement
tribunals with a free flow of information, whether valid or not,
would not extend to protect opposition based on meriless claims.
This is particularly important because of the potential for abuse
inherent in any right to engage in economic pressure based on
unproven claims of discrimination and the attendant inroads such
opposition makes on the policy of industrial peace. The legislative
history accompanying section 704(a) discusses neither whether
economic pressure was intended to be included within the term
''opposition" nor whether an employment practice must actually be
unlawful before section 704(a) protections apply. That history, if it
provides any guidance at all, shows that the section's framers were
only interested in assuring a free flow of information and access to
law enforcement tribunals.80
78 See, e.g., Winsey v. Pace College,'394 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (suggesting that
protection may be contingent upon assertion of a meritorious claim where the opposition to
practices for which protection was sought commenced prior to the 1972 extension of Title
VII's coverage, the practices opposed were not unlawful prior to the extension of coverage,
and the opposition, therefore, was held not protected by § 704(a), despite continued
opposition after the extension of Title VII's coverage). Another court has held that the
protections of § 704(a) are not applicable unless there is proof of opposition to exclusionary
practices, but the court drew no distinctions based on the meritoriousness of claims. See
McRae v. Goddard College, 10 FEP Cases 143 (D. Vt. 1975).
19 See text at notes 57-58 supra.
80 The present § 704(a) originated as § 705(a) in H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963), and contained, the language of the statute as finally enacted including the clause
making it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against a person "because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title." U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 2010-11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1964 LEGIS. HIST.). A majority
of the House Judiciary Committee interpreted then § 705(a) to prohibit employer, labor
union, or employment agency discrimination against an employee or applicant solely
"because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in the
enforcement of this title." H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 1, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963), 1964 LEGIS.
HIsT. 2028. The House Labor Committee bill, H.R. 10,144, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962),
contained a provision identical to § 705(a) of H.R. 7152. H.R. REP. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962), 1964 LEGIS. HIsT. 2165. In the Senate, no debate was devoted to the meaning
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Moreover, the broad language in Pettway, the primary author-
ity relied on by the EEOC in expanding the protection for "opposi-
tion" to include peaceful economic pressure, does not really sup-
port that broader protection. The "opposition" protected from
retaliation in Pettway involved access to and the free flow of infor-
mation (albeit false and malicious information). Economic pressure
going beyond resort to statutory procedures for eradicating dis-
crimination was not involved in the case and thus not even consid-
ered by the court. Furthermore, the 1972 Amendments to Tide
VII, providing the EEOC with power to initiate lawsuits in federal
court, 81 have removed one of the major arguments supporting an
expansive reading of the statute to protect economic pressure-the
EEOC's lack of power to secure enforcement of Title VII viola-
tions.
Sanction for "opposition" encompassing economic pressure
thus appears to conflict with the elaborate institutional mechanisms
created by Title VII and other state and federal civil rights acts for
channeling protest regarding employment discrimination claims to
the EEOC and the courts. The goal of resolving discrimination
claims through these mechanisms was reemphasized by the Su-
preme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.82 in the context of
the relationship between labor arbitration and Title VII enforce-
ment procedures, as follows:
Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the pre-
ferred means for achieving [equal employment opportunity]. To
this end, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state
and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well as the
Commission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes
of then § 705(a) of H.R. 7152, which had passed the House, and the only change made in the
provision was to renumber it as § 704(a). See 1964 LEGIS. HisT. 3051-52. Thus, neither the
Dirksen substitute (1964 LEGIs. HIsT. 3017), nor the Clark-Case substitute (1964 LEGIS.
HIsT. 3033) changed the language, and the Clark-Case Interpretative Memorandum sheds
no light on the scope of the protection. 1964 LEGIs. HisT. 3040. A comparative analysis of
Senate and House Bills inserted into the record, however, characterized the protection
provided by the anti-retaliation provision of H.R. 7152 as prohibiting discrimination against
an individual for taking part in an investigation or proceeding "or because he has otherwise
supported the policies of the act." 1964 LEGIS. HIST. 3070. Section 704(a) was amended in
1972 to ensure that joint labor-management apprenticeship committees were also subject to
its prohibitions; the scope of the protection provided was not debated, discussed, or
analyzed. See COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, U.S. SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1775, 1785, 1854, 1875 (Comm.
Print 1972).
81 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. III, 1973).
82 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see text accompanying notes 118-24 infra.
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through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the ag-
grieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit.
[I]n its amended form . . . final responsibility for
enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts ....
[F]ederal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure
compliance with Title VII.
In addition to reposing ultimate authority in federal courts,
Congress gave private individuals a significant role in the en-
forcement process of Title VII. Individual grievants usually
initiate the Commission's investigatory and conciliatory proce-
dures. . . . [T]he private right of action remains an essential
means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII.
In addition, legislative enactments in this area have long
evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping reme-
dies against discrimination.... Moreover, the legislative history
of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an indi-
vidual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII
and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear infer-
ence is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than
supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination.8 3
Significantly, the Court did not mention any right to engage in
economic pressure in opposition to employment discrimination,
real or imagined, as part of the enforcement scheme. Not only
would recognizing a right to strike or engage in other economic
pressure discourage utilization of Title VII and other statutory
procedures for obtaining relief, but it would also return resolution
of discriminatory employment practices to the arena of economic
warfare. One important goal of Title VII was to channel discrimi-
nation claims away from friction and contentiousness.8 4 Implicit in
the creation of institutional mechanisms for relief, then, must be
not only an avoidance of the hardship produced by economic
warfare but also a determination that, because minority groups had
been so economically disadvantaged by discriminatory practices,
83 Id at 44-45, 47-49 (footnotes omitted). In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Supreme Court, ruling that the filing of an EEOC charge of
discrimination under Title VII does not toll the applicable state statute of limitations
governing claims made pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)),
reemphasized that remedies for employment discrimination created by the different federal
civil rights statutes are separate, distinct, and independent. Id. at 1721.
" Thus, a majority of the House Judiciary Committee reporting H.R. 7152, which
eventually passed the House and formed the basis for Senate action and the eventual
passage of Title VII, viewed statutory rights and enforcement procedures as necessary at
least in part "to cure this evil [discrimination] and before racial unrest eats irretrievably into
the body of the American industrial system." H.R. REP. No. 914, pt. 2, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1963), 1964 LEGIs. HIST. 2150.
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they stood to gain little in tests of economic strength in the
workplace.
Although Emporium did not interpret the language of section
704(a), its recognition of the incompatibility of a self-help economic
pressure device and the goals of Title VII with respect to work-
place labor disputes applies to a proper determination of the scope
of section 704(a) and to whether economic pressure by a minority
group in derogation of an exclusive bargaining representative is
protected by section 8(a)(1). Thus, because protection for economic
pressure would extend to all groups protected by Title VII, sanc-
tioning such pressure by a broad interpretation of section 704(a)
would result in competing claims against an employer from various
factions, the satisfaction of which would inevitably favor one group
over others, setting those groups against the favored group and
threatening industrial peace. The divisions and strife caused
thereby could only weaken the bargaining position of the protest-
ers, leaving them and their claims effectively at the mercy of the
party possessing economic power. To read the Court's comments in
this regard as having logical force only with respect to the issue of
"protection" under section 8(a)(1) means that the minority claims
were raised in the wrong forum. If section 704(a) provides an
independent right to pursue self-help, it is of little or no conse-
quence that the employer does not violate section 8(a)(1) by firing
the protesters seeking direct bargaining in derogation of the exclu-
sive bargaining representative. Relief comparable to that recover-
able under section 8(a)(1), including reinstatement and back-pay,
may be obtained on a showing that section 704(a) has been violated
and, even more important, in appropriate circumstances an injunc-
tion may be obtained on request of the EEOC (and perhaps by a
private party) requiring reinstatement prior to completion of a full
trial on the merits. 85
85 See § 706(f)(2), (g), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(2), (g) (Supp. III, 1973). Section (0(2)
authorizes the EEOC, or the Attorney General in a case involving a governmental body, to
seek temporary injunctive relief pending final disposition of an employment discrimination
charge. Section 706(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(h) (1970), provides that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970), which withdraws jurisdiction from federal courts to issue
injunctions in certain types of labor disputes, shall not apply with respect to civil actions
brought pursuant to Title VII. Interim injunctive relief on request of an individual
aggrieved party has been issued prior to a trial on the merits of a § 704(a) case requiring an
employer to reinstate an employee, who had been discharged for filing an EEOC charge,
pending final disposition by the EEOC of the discrimination charge or until EEOC jurisdic-
tion terminates. Hyland v. Kenner Prod. Co., 10 FEP Cases 367 (S.D. Ohio 1974). See also
Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974)
(private action for preliminary relief prior to filing a § 704(a) suit maintainable, but no award
or relief may be appropriate because comparable relief obtained in EEOC suit pursuant to
§ 706(0(2)). Contra, Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
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The considerations advanced above also argue against recog-
nizing a limited right to engage in self-help conditioned upon the
existence of proven, as opposed to claimed, discriminatory em-
ployment practices.8 6 Although a limited right of self-help might
deter its irresponsible use by minority groups in support of frivo-
lous claims, the unacceptable risk of frustrating the institutional
mechanisms for obtaining relief remains. Similarly, section 704(a)
should not be construed to permit a limited right of self-help when
employees seek to present grievances raising discrimination claims
with their employer, activity which Justice Marshall intimated in
Emporium would not be protected by NLRA sections 7 and 9(a).87
In the first place, the plethora of other civil enforcement
mechanisms and the strong policy of discouraging economic pres-
sure in connection with employment discrimination claims suggest
rejection of any interpretation of section 704(a) to protect activity
otherwise not protected or prohibited by the NLRA. Second, such
an interpretation would conflict with another important goal of the
national labor policy-to discourage, in furtherance of industrial
peace, bypassing grievance-arbitration procedures and resort to
economic pressure as a means of resolving grievance disputes. 8
Finally, sanctioning self-help might have the unanticipated result of
delaying, and possibly negating, effective relief from a court subse-
quently exercising Title VII jurisdiction over the discriminatory
employment practices opposed. The award of relief in a Title VII
action is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and
may be completely denied after a finding that Title VII has been
violated if the reasons for denial do not frustrate Title VII's
policies of eradicating and deterring discrimination and making
persons whole for injuries suffered because of past discrimina-
tion.8 9 Deliberate bypassing of civil remedies and resort to
economic pressure, however, may be viewed as conduct sufficiently
conflicting with the concerns of Title VII, that discrimination
claims be channeled away from economic warfare, as to outweigh,
in a particular case, other- Title VII policies concerning relief.
88 See, e.g., Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining
Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46, 76 (1969).
87 420 U.S. at 61 n.12.
'8 See Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), discussed in
text accompanying notes 105-18 infra.
s' Section 7 06(g) provides: "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate .... ." 42 U.S.C.




The interpretation of section 704 suggested here does not
render the phrase "because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice" meaningless. Although, as previ-
ously noted, 90 the existence of that phrase distinguishes section
704(a) from the anti-retaliation provisions in other labor statutes, it
does not follow that Congress intended to include economic pres-
sure as a form of protected "opposition." Judicial expansion of the
narrower analogous protections provided by anti-retaliation provi-
sions of other labor statutes established that all types of access to
enforcement tribunals, and not just those types specifically listed
(e.g., charge filing, testimony), were protected against reprisal-a
protection expressly provided for in section 704(a). The protec-
tions of the anti-retaliation provisions in other labor statutes, how-
ever, do not extend beyond ensuring free flow of information to
enforcement tribunals. Because a significant departure from labor
and civil rights policies discouraging economic pressure to eradi-
cate employment discrimination claims should not be inferred
from congressional silence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that
the failure of Congress to expressly include self-help within the
concept of "opposition" means that the protection was to extend
only so far as to prohibit reprisals taken against those who protest
employment discrimination, but who do not seek access to en-
forcement tribunals or resort to economic pressure, and who are
not themselves victims of employment discrimination. The white
male who vocally opposes his company's employment practices
affecting blacks and females and who does not resort to economic
pressure in furtherance of his protest would be protected against
reprisal by the interpretation of section 704(a) suggested here. A
protester in an analogous predicament under NLRA section
8(a)(4), for instance, would not be so protected, although protec-
tion against reprisal might be derived from sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3), which have no counterparts in Title VII other than the
phrase in section 704(a) under discussion.
III
SECTION 704(a) AND BREACH OF THE UNION
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Although Emporium did not deal with minority group self-help
against employment discrimination where there was a breach of the
" See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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union's duty of fair representation, it is useful to assess whether the
outcome in that case would have been altered by either a claim that
the union had violated its duty or an adjudication that it had in fact
breached its fair representation duty to the minority group.
The injection of a claimed violation of the union's duty of fair
representation in connection with the claimed discriminatory con-
duct of the employer and/or the union should not alter either the
scope of section 704(a) or the protections provided by section
8(a)(1). 91 This is so even though the inconsistency between minority
group self-help with direct bargaining as a goal and the principle
of exclusive representation embodied in the NLRA is significantly
lessened, if not entirely eradicated, when a claim of forfeiture of
exclusive representation is made. Furthermore, despite the fact
that the economic pressure engaged in by a minority group may be
in violation of a no-strike obligation in the governing collective
agreement and therefore unprotected under conventional Board
analysis, 92 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB 93 and NLRB v. Magnavox
Co.94 supply strong bases for concluding that the no-strike clause
breach is either excused or that the right to strike against allegedly
discriminatory employment practices and in protest against union
violation of the duty of fair representation in connection therewith
cannot be waived by a no-strike obligation.9" Finally, the Board's
9 In addition to the concerns expressed by Justice Douglas in Emporium of "locking in"
minority groups to an "unfair" union, analogies to Board doctrines applying a "comparative
fault" approach to excuse self-help in response to egregious unfair labor practices (see note
93 infra) are useful in determining the protection afforded by § 8(a)(1) for protest in part
against union breach of the duty of fair representation. Opposing considerations, however,
are that this would create yet another remedy for employment discrimination and there
would be difficulties in applying the "comparative fault" approach to privilege self-help
protest against what could be deemed "minor" unfair employment practices. See Meltzer,
supra note 1, at 43-45. But cf. Gould, supra note 86, at 67-72.
92 Strikes in breach of contract are deemed "unprotected" activities. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939).
93 350 U.S. 270 (1956). In Mastro Plastics, serious unfair labor practices committed by
the employer were held, in effect, to excuse or exonerate a violation of a no-strike clause.
For subsequent application by the Board, see, e.g., Arlan's Dep't Store of Mich., Inc., 133
N.L.R.B. 802 (1961); Mid-West Metallic Prod. Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1958). See also Cox,
The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1, 16-18 (1958);
Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525, 544-47 (1969).
94 415 U.S. 322 (1974). The Court ruled that certain fundamental NLRA § 7 protec-
tions, namely the right of employees to solicit for unions during nonworking time and to
distribute union literature in nonworking time in nonworking areas, could not be contractu-
ally waived. The Court added in Emporium, 420 U.S. at 64 n.14, that the statutory right to
choose a new or to have no bargaining representative could not be waived by the exclusive
bargaining representative either.
15 See also Suburban Transit Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 185, 89 L.R.R.M. 1471 (1975),
where the Board, in addition to ruling that the right of a group of employees to strike in
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determination in Bekins Moving & Storage Co.,96 to refuse issuance
of certifications to labor organizations victorious in NLRB elections
but guilty of violating the duty of fair representation by engaging
in race, alienage, or national origin discrimination, and by implica-
tion to revoke certifications once issued (and presumably sanction a
refusal to continue recognizing a union) upon a general showing of
unfair representation, 97 suggests that protection might well be
extended to other forms of collateral attack against labor organiza-
tions alleged to be violating the duty of fair representation.
Nevertheless, providing special treatment for a right of self-
help in protest against alleged violations of the duty of fair rep-
resentation appears unwarranted in light of the wealth of other
remedies made available to deal with claims of unfair representa-
tion without resort to self-help. 98 In addition to available avenues
of relief before the Board and the courts, section 703(a)(2) of Title
VII creates a specific right to be free from union conduct involving
alleged discrimination such as breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation. That provision was enacted in part because of the difficul-
ties encountered in obtaining relief pursuant to NLRA and Railway
Labor Act99 concepts of unfair representation which require proof
of invidious and arbitrary bad faith conduct on the part of a
union.100
support of a challenge to the incumbent union because they were dissatisfied with its rep-
resentation had not been waived by the applicable collective bargaining agreement's no-
strike clause, determined that Magnavox would not permit employees through a no-strike
clause to waive their rights to strike in support of "their right to select or reject a bargaining
representative that arguably does or does not accord them fair treatment." (Slip Op. at 11)
(emphasis added). As a consequence, discharges of the strikers were held to violate NLRA
§ '8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3).
96 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 87 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974). See also Bell & Howell Co., 213
N.L.R.B. No. 79, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974); Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. Nos.
80 & 81, 86 L.R.R.M. 1175 & 1177 (1974).
97 Id. With respect to revocation of certifications, see Metal Workers Local 1 (Hughes
Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); A.O. Smith Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957).
98 A violation of the union duty of fair representation contravenes LMRA § 8(b)(1)(A)
and may be the subject of a § 301 action. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171. -177-80, 186-88
(1967). A lawsuit against a breach of the union duty of fair representation may also be
maintained under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). See, e.g., Retana v. Elevator Operators Local 14,
453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972).
99 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
100 It has been previously analyzed that Title VII prohibits much of the conduct which
also constitutes a breach of a union's duty of fair representation in a discrimination context.
See Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L.
REv. 771 (1965). That difficulties, expense, and delay attendant with fair representation cases
have discouraged resort to the remedy has also been the subject of commentary. See, e.g.,
Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 547, 557-58 (1963); Sovern, Race Discrimination and
the National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, in N.Y.U., 16TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3, 5 (1963).
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Moreover, delays resulting from the EEOC's case backlog and
the concern that union unfair representation "locks in" an ag-
grieved party and denies effective relief have been counteracted to
a great degree by the 1972 Amendments to Title VII.1°1 The
Amendments provide that a charging party must be issued a right
to sue notice, which triggers the right to commence a Title VII civil
action in court, at least 180 days (or the expiration of the period of
referral to a state fair employment practice agency, whichever is
later) after the filing of its charge if the charge has not otherwise
been disposed of by an EEOC-initiated lawsuit or settlement.
Nor is protection for self-help collateral attack against a cer-
tified or recognized union, claimed to be unfairly representing
employees by discriminating against them, consistent with Bekins.
There, the Board emphasized the necessity for actual proof that
the union had engaged in conduct warranting a refusal to issue a
certification, although it failed to specify the nature and quantum
of proof required. 10 2 To protect self-help would be to permit
minority groups to determine the appropriate circumstances for
issuing or revoking a certification involving a labor union that has
won an otherwise proper election, a function delegated exclusively
to the Board by section 9 of the NLRA.10 3 Consequently, protec-
tion for minority group picketing would attach, if at all, by analogy
to Bekins only after a Board determination refusing to issue or
revoking a certification that had been rendered.10 4
Finally, permitting a self-help remedy under section 704(a) of
101 Section 706(f)(1) provides in pertinent part:
If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) .... is dismissed
by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of
such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d)
.... whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section
or the Attorney General has not filed a civil action in a case involving a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision, or the Commission has not entered
into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the
Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, gov-
ernmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the person aggrieved and
within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought
against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be
aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any
person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment
practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. III, 1973).
102 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974).
103 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
104 To the extent that Suburban Transit Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 185, 89 L.R.R.M.
1471 (1975), suggests that the Board will protect a strike seeking to change a bargaining
representative when it is claimed to represent employees unfairly, that case is inconsistent
with Bekins's insistence on actual proof of unfair representation, and threatens the goal of
industrial peace by encouraging abuse of a self-help remedy by irresponsible individuals
pressing frivolous unfair representation claims. See text at note 86 supra.
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Title VII or NLRA section 7 when fair representation duty
breaches are claimed would again mean that when self-help is
utilized, the resolution of discrimination and fair representation
claims would be dependent on economic power, most of which
resides in employers and unions. Indeed, where the opposition
against allegedly unfair employment practices is directed at em-
ployers and unions, the minority group may be in an even weaker
power position than it would be if it were not claiming breach of
the duty of fair representation. When a claimed breach of that
duty is not involved, the possibility at least exists that the union's
institutional power might be brought to bear in support of the
minority group's claim. Alignment against both employer and
union economic power, however, does not place the minority
group in a favorable position to prevail. Title VII enforcement
mechanisms, including civil actions, redress that imbalance of
economic power by providing for resolution of the conflict in a
forum where economic power is not relevant in determining the
reach of the antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII. Bypassing
these procedures even in the presence of a claimed breach of the
union's duty of fair representation conflicts with the goals of Title
VII and may result in ultimate failure to achieve equal employment
opportunity.
IV
MINORITY GROUP SELF-HELP IN BREACH
OF NO-STRIKE OBLIGATIONS
Despite the conclusion that the policies of Title VII and the
NLRA would not be served by interpreting section 704(a) to
protect economic pressure by minority groups in opposition to
employment discrimination, the EEOC's broader reading of the
provision may ultimately prevail. That broad interpretation may, in
turn, impinge on developing policy under the Supreme Court's
decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770.105 In that
case, the Court held that in appropriate circumstances injunctions
could be issued, despite the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 10 6 to restrain strikes in breach of no-strike
105 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
106 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970). Section 4 of the Act provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute.., from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
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clauses in collective bargaining agreements concerning disputes
resolvable by the grievance-arbitration mechanisms of those
agreements. Although strikes in support of employment discrimi-
nation claims subject to resolution in a contractual grievance-arbi-
tration procedure would seem to be within the category of enjoin-
able pressure established by Boys Markets, recognition of a protected
right to engage in economic pressure in opposition to discrimina-
tory practices in conjunction with claims of union unfair represen-
tation might be viewed as negating any contractual obligation not
to strike. In Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 10 7 the Supreme Court
determined that proper invocation of section 502 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) would negate a no-strike
pledge and deprive a trial court of authority to award Boys Markets
injunctive relief.'0 8 An independent right to strike in protest of
employment discrimination and unfair representation might oper-
ate to negate a no-strike pledge by analogy to Mastro Plastics'1 9
because the unfair employment practices committed by the em-
ployer and protested by employees, in effect, excused the breach of
contract. Or, the negation of the no-strike obligation might derive
from Magnavox, 0 in which the Court held that fundamental rights
protected by NLRA section 7 to solicit fellow employees and to
distribute union literature for the purpose of changing bargaining
representation as well as for the purpose of supporting an incum-
bent representative could not be "waived" by a clause included
in a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, in view of the
Court's declaration in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.-" that "[o]f
necessity, the rights conferred by [Title VII] can form no part of
the collective bargaining process since waiver of these rights would
defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII, ' ' 112
an independent right of economic protest would appear not subject
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute.
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
107 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
106 Id. at 386-87. Section 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970), provides that refusals to work in
the presence of abnormally dangerous working conditions will not be deemed strikes.
109 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). See note 93 supra.
110 415 U.S. 322 (1974); see notes 94-95, 104 supra.
" 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
112 Id. at 51.
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to prohibition or waiver by a contractual no-strike pledge in any
event. Under either theory, therefore, jurisdiction to issue an
injunction under the authority of Boys Markets and Gateway Coal
might not exist."13
However, even if the contention advanced here is accepted
and no independent statutory protection is granted to minority
group self-help economic pressure in support of discrimination
and unfair representation claims, injunctive relief against such
pressure in breach of a no-strike obligation in a collective bargain-
ing agreement may still be inappropriate. The withdrawal of fed-
eral court jurisdiction to issue injunctions restraining conduct oc-
curring in connection with labor disputes affected by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was applied to minority group self-help by the
Supreme Court in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 114 in
which the Court held that strikes, picketing, and other forms of
pressure in support of demands that a company remedy past
discriminatory practices by hiring black clerks in its stores consti-
tuted a "labor dispute" not enjoinable by a federal court. The
accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia Act policies with those of
LMRA section 301,11 effected when Boys Markets authorized is-
suance of labor injunctions in certain categories of cases, was
113 Injunctive relief may also be available if the object of minority group strikes and
picketing is to force an employer to violate a state or federal civil rights act. See Kilberg,
Current Civil Rights Problems in the Collective Bargaining Process: The Bethlehem and AT&T
Experiences, 27 VAND. L. REV. 81, 112 (1974); Gould, supra note 86, at 77-83; Note, Racial
Employment Picketing: Availability and Extent of Injunctive Relief, 51 MINN. L. REV. 92 (1966).
Section 705(g)(4) of Title VII empowers the EEOC, upon the request of an employer or
labor organization which is confronted by employees or union members who refuse or
threaten to refuse to cooperate in effecting the provisions of Title VII, to assist in such
effectuation by conciliation or other remedial action provided by the statute. Section
706(f)(2) provides that whenever a charge is filed with the EEOC and it concludes after a
preliminary investigation that prompt judicial action is necessary, the EEOC, or the Attorney
General in a case involving a governmental body, may bring an action for temporary or
preliminary relief pending final disposition of the charge. This provision may provide a basis
for injunctive relief in support of efforts under § 7 05(g)(4 ) threatened by minority group
economic pressure. For use of state criminal conspiracy doctrines and statutes as the basis for
criminal prosecutions against persons engaging in boycotts protesting racially discriminatory
employment practices, see Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975) (barring removal of a
state criminal conspiracy prosecution to federal court pursuant to the civil rights removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1970)).
114 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
115 Section 301 provides in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
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justified as necessary to prevent undermining the labor arbitration
process and the policy considerations established by the Steelwork-
ers Trilogy, 1 6 affirmatively favoring labor arbitration as a pre-
ferred mechanism for resolving labor disputes arising from collec-
tive bargaining agreements. As a consequence, where parties to a
labor dispute have not agreed that arbitration shall be the final and
exclusive mechanism for resolving differences between them, hav-
ing reserved the right to use economic pressure to resolve those
matters, injunctive relief against a strike is not appropriate." 7
An argument might follow from this that where labor arbitra-
tion is not a preferred mechanism under federal policy for final
and exclusive resolution of a particular type of workplace labor
dispute, the policy underlying Boys Markets's relaxation of the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is absent
and injunctions are not appropriate to restrain economic pressure
in support of those disputes. In Gardner-Denver, an employee
discharged for poor work performance claimed that the real rea-
son for the company's action was race discrimination, an issue he
raised for the first time in the last step of the grievance procedure
preceding arbitration." 8 An arbitrator upheld his discharge but
with no reference to, or discussion of, the discrimination claim." 9
In the employee's Title VII civil action, filed after the arbitrator's
award and after the EEOC had determined that there was no
reasonable cause to believe Title VII had been violated with respect
to his discharge, the employer contended that the arbitratidn
award should bar the lawsuit, or at the very least, be dispositive of
the race discrimination issue on its merits. The Supreme Court
reversed the holdings of both lower courts that the arbitration
award was a complete bar to subsequent Title VII proceedings.
The Court reasoned that the federal courts were granted plenary
enforcement responsibility for Title VII claims and labor arbitra-
tion was given no role in the enforcement scheme endorsed by
Title VII.'2 0 Arbitration, moreover, was considered to be inferior
to court procedures for the final resolution of rights created by
Title VII. The arbitrator, the Court emphasized, is a creature of
116 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
117 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 454 F.2d
1324 (7th Cir. 1972).
I'l 415 U.S. at 42.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 47.
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companies and unions, whose role is to dispose of issues relating to
rights which are waivable in the bargaining process, unlike Title
VII rights, and to effect the collective bargaining agreement, not
Tide VII. Moreover, securing Title VII rights pursuant to the
enforcement mechanism created by Congress required, the Court
concluded, application of the rules of evidence, discovery proce-
dures, compulsory process, testimony under oath, and a right of
cross examination, each of which is often severely limited or
unavailable in arbitration.121 Consequently, the Court ruled that
prior arbitration of an employment discrimination claim would not
bar Title VII proceedings. Furthermore, the Court determined
that deferral to an arbitration award as dispositive on the merits of
the discrimination issue in a subsequent Title VII proceeding was
not warranted. Instead, the arbitrator's award is admissible into
evidence, to be given whatever weight is deemed appropriate in a
trial de novo.122
The Supreme Court's resolution of competing policy choices in
Gardner-Denver robs labor arbitration of the finality and exclusivity
so critical to the issuance of injunctive relief against strikes called in
support of grievances arising out of the administration of collective
bargaining agreements. Thus, the decidedly secondary role as-
signed to labor arbitration of employment discrimination claims
argues strongly against permitting comprehensive relief, including
an order compelling arbitration, conventionally ordered in connec-
tion with breach of contract strikes in section 301 cases.
There are, however, substantial counterconsiderations. Al-
though determining that labor arbitration had not been given a
role in the enforcement of Title VII and was inappropriate for the
final resolution of Title VII claims, the Court in Gardner-Denver,
emphasizing the conciliatory and therapeutic123 characteristics of
the process, indicated that arbitration of an employment discrimi-
nation claim might produce a settlement satisfactory to all parties.
This possibility, the Court reasoned, provided incentive for the
employer, as well as for an aggrieved employee, to continue to
utilize arbitration as a means of avoiding expensive and time-
consuming civil litigation of employment discrimination claims. 124
121 Id. at 57-58.
122 Id. at 60.
"' Labor arbitration was associated specifically with "therapy" in Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), in which Justice Douglas, recognizing that arbitration could
not bind all three parties to the dispute in that case, and thus possibly might not resolve the
controversy, nevertheless determined that it should be compelled on the theory that its
therapeutic characteristics might aid in resolving the dispute. Id. at 272.
124 415 U.S. at 54-55. The Court also concluded that the quid pro quo of an agreement
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If this interest in the therapeutic possibilities of arbitration is to
be encouraged, injunctive relief against a minority group strike in
breach of contract coupled with an order requiring resort to
arbitration of the discrimination claim appears warranted. 125 The
trial court possesses sufficient equitable power to fashion a decree
to avoid the possibility that this requirement of initial resort to
arbitration will be futile because the complaining party's interests
will not be adequately represented due to union breach of the duty
of fair representation. If sufficient evidence were presented to
sustain a prima facie claim of union unfair representation, the
court could order that the complaining employee formally be
designated a party to the arbitration, with a right of counsel, 126
thus assuring that the full range of "therapy" be given a fair
opportunity to function. Requiring safeguards of this type for
individuals in arbitration is frequently ordered by the Board in
remedying union breaches of the duty of fair representation in
grievance handling 127 and would also, therefore, appear appropri-
ate in arbitrations required by an order halting a breach of contract
strike over an employment discrimination claim. Although arbitra-
tion of employment discrimination claims may have been relegated
to the status of "conciliation," requiring resort to conciliatory pro-
cedures is not totally inconsistent with the framework of Title VII,
which itself requires at least an initial opportunity for conciliation
to occur before enforcement proceedings may commence.' 28
Of course, injunctive relief in these circumstances will be
conditioned on satisfaction of the other prerequisites established by
Boys Markets. An employer must demonstrate that the minority
group strike has caused and is causing irreparable harm and that
the harm to it as a result of a denial of relief will be greater than
the harm to those enjoined if relief is granted-showings which
may prove difficult if only a handful of individuals actually
strike. 129 Furthermore, it may be that the union is not responsible
to arbitrate-the agreement not to strike--would be of such great importance to employers
as to outweigh the costs imposed by a secondary role assigned to labor arbitration in
adjudicating employment discrimination claims.
125 In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Court stated that "an order compelling
arbitration should be viewed as one of the available remedies when a breach of the union's
duty is proved." 386 U.S. at 196.
"I6 See Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 24 ARB. J.
197, 218-24 (1969).
'27 See Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 837 (1967); NLRB v. IUE Local 485, 454 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972); Teamsters Local 186,
203 N.L.R.B. 799 (1973).
128 See Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic Div. of FMC Corp., 456 F.2d 1359
(9th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Lines R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968).
129 In Boys Markets, the Court quoted Justice Brennan's dissent in Sinclair Refining Co.
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for the strike action of a minority group and that an injunction
ordering an end to a strike for which it is not responsible cannot
issue, even if the injunction order sought runs only against indi-
vidual employees comprising the minority group. 130 Although reso-
lution of this issue is not free from doubt, since minority group
strike action in support of employment discrimination claims will in
most cases be, at least in part, a protest against a union's alleged
failure to adequately represent the employees, for the purposes of
interim relief, an injunction against the strike and an order requir-
ing the company, the union, and the dissident employees to arbi-
trate the dispute serves an overriding concern of both Title VII
and section 301 that workplace discrimination disputes be settled
peacefully. When procedural safeguards are provided to minimize
unfair representation at an arbitration hearing, this approach also
discourages unfair representation in connection with employment
discrimination claims. The test suggested by the court of appeals in
Emporium for determining when to withdraw section 7 protec-
tion-whether the union is remedying the discrimination by the
most efficient and efficacious means-might instead be employed
to assess the merits of a defense that equitable relief against
minority group economic pressure requiring arbitration of em-
ployment discrimination claims should be withheld because there is
no union responsibility for the pressure or because Boys Markets
relief cannot run directly against individuals.
In sum, many impediments to awarding injunctive relief
against minority group economic pressure in breach of a collective
bargaining agreement exist. Nevertheless, when an employment
discrimination claim is arbitrable under a contractual grievance
arbitration procedure, injunctive relief forbidding a strike by a
minority group in support of its position, requiring arbitration of
the claims, and providing appropriate safeguards against union
unfair representation of minority group interests in arbitration
procedures seems consistent with policies developed pursuant to
section 301 when those policies are considered in conjunction with
the concerns of Title VII that opportunities for informal resolution
v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962): "Beyond this, the District Court must, of course,
consider whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of
equity. ... 398 U.S. at 254.
130 See generally Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975)
(collecting cases on union responsibility generally for unauthorized strikes); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. OCAW, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971) (individual liability for damages not permitted);
Spelfogel, Wildcat Strikes and Minority Concerted Activity-Discipline, Damage Suits and Injunc-
tions, 24 LAB. L.J. 592, 611-15 (1973).
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of workplace discrimination claims be fostered, encouraged, and
supported.
V
ERASING LMRA RESTRICTIONS ON ECONOMIC PRESSURE
TO PERMIT MINORITY GROUP SELF-HELP
Justice Marshall's suggestion in Emporium that "'in some cir-
cumstances rights created by the NLRA and related laws affecting
the employment relationship must be broadened to accommodate
the policies of Title VII,' u 3 1 invites inquiry into whether the restric-
tions on concerted economic pressure contained in the LMRA are
to be eased, thereby expanding the rights of minority groups to
engage in self-help. There are two dimensions to this problem: the
first is the development of substantive defenses to economic pres-
sure otherwise prohibited by the LMRA, .and the second involves
denying persons charged with discriminatory employment prac-
tices standing to invoke, or access to, unfair labor practice -proce-
dures.
Arguments favoring a relaxation of the specific substantive
prohibitions of the LMRA, in response to the defense of alleged
discrimination in employment were not received favorably in the
first judicial encounter, a case in which section 8(b)(1)(B) was
implicated because the economic pressure was directed at an em-
ployer's demotion of a black assistant foreman.132 In Laborers Local
478,133 the Board, with subsequent court approval, reasoned that a
strike seeking to compel retention of a supervisory employee and
otherwise regarded as a violation of LMRA section 8(b)(1)(B)1 34
would not escape sanction simply because it was also in protest of
alleged discriminatory treatment of the minority group supervisor.
It has been suggested, however, that the specific restrictions im-
posed by section 8(b)(7)(A), which prohibits picketng for:arecogni-
tional or organizational objective where an employer has lawfully
131 420 U.S. at 73 n.26. justice Marshall construed Senator Clark's interpretative
memorandum introduced during the debates on Title VII, supra note 36, as negating -only
the suggestion that Title VII 'would constrict access to other statutory schemes.
,3' Section 8(b)(1)(B) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labororganiza-
tion or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce .... (B) an employer in the selection of his
representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances
. " 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
133 204 N.L.R.B. 357 (1973), enforced, 503 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 926 (1975).
134 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
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recognized another labor organization, 135 should be relaxed when
it has been proven that the "lawfully recognized" labor organiza-
tion is guilty of a breach of its duty of fair representation. 136 For
the same reason that reconferring "protected" status on minority
group self-help pressure after the Board has determined to refuse
issuance of a certification' 37 would be appropriate, a limitation on
13' Section 8(b)(7) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select
such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such
labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this
Act any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may
not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under
section 9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under
section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty
days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when such a
petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the
provisions of section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest
on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the
Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided
fiurther, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any
picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public
(including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a
contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce
any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment,
not to pick up, deliver or not to perform any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which would
otherwise be an unfair practice under this section 8(b).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970). Section 8(b)(4)(C) is also relevant:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or com-
modities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is-
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a
particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another
labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees
under the provisions of section 9[.]
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (1970).
13' Gould, supra note 86, at 76.
137 See notes 96-104 and accompanying text supra. Compare Hod Carriers Local 840, 135
N.L.R.B. 1153, 1166-67 n.24 (1962), where the Board ruled that a meritorious § 8(a)(5)
charge would excuse the union's failure to file an election petition within the time period
specified for permissible recognitional and organizational picketing under § 8(b)(7)(C),
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the conventional prohibitions against recognitional and organiza-
tional picketing contained in section 8(b)(7)(A) appears warranted.
As a practical matter, however, the only safe course for a minority
organization to follow before commencing economic pressure for a
recognitional or organizational purpose in these circumstances
would involve first securing a determination of a union's breach of
duty and a revocation of its certification or right to continued
recognition. Otherwise, the requisite "proof" of breach would not
have been reviewed and accepted, and the minority group would
be deciding itself when and if a breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation had occurred. The aims of both Title VII and the LMRA of
providing enforcement tribunals and appropriate procedural safe-
guards for adjudicating such claims would not be served by permit-
ting recognitional and organizational picketing for section
8(b)(7)(A) purposes on the strength of an unadjudicated claim of a
breach of the duty of fair representation.
These considerations, in connection with sections 8(b)(1)(B)
and 8(b)(7)(A) prohibitions, suggest that relaxing the substantive
prohibitions of union unfair labor practices generally should de-
pend on whether the interests served by those prohibitions conflict
fundamentally with the mandate of Title VII. For instance, the
unfair labor practices defined by sections 8(b)(4)(B)138 and 8(b)(7)
were designed to circumscribe what was otherwise viewed as legiti-
mate conduct seeking better economic conditions of workers in the
interest of preserving equally fundamental goals. Section 8(b)(4)(B)
sought to avoid involving employers and others in labor disputes
thereby rendering picketing beyond the reasonable period (not to exceed 30 days) not
illegal.
138 It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manuftcture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is:
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person,
or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organiza-
tion has been certified as the representative of such employees under the
provisions of section 9: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall
be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary
strike or primary picketing[.]
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4XB) (1970).
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which they had no power to resolve, and to protect the public from
widespread utilization of economic pressure devices. The impor-
tance of eradicating unlawful discrimination does not detract from
the interest in confining the allowable area of economic conflict to
those possessing power over the adjustment and resolution of labor
disputes, including claims of unlawful employment discrimination..
Furthermore, insofar as Title VII itself is designed to provide a
substitute for economic pressure by requiring resort to informal
administrative processes for adjustment of employment discrimina-
tion claims, permitting economic pressure otherwise proscribed by
section 8(b)(4) is not consistent with the policy of Tide VII.
In the case of section 8(b)(7), the interests served are protec-
tion of the Board's representation machinery, lawfully recognized
labor organizations, and employees from coercion in the selection
of bargaining representatives. For example, where a labor organi-
zation has not been recognized, a question of representation may
appropriately be raised. If a valid election has not been conducted
within the preceding twelve months, recognitional and organiza-
tional picketing is permitted for a reasonable period of time (not to
exceed thirty days) without the filing of an election petition and,
thereafter, until an election is held and determined to be valid. 3 9
Again, if the interests served by section 8(b)(7) are worthy of
protection despite otherwise legitimate union efforts to improve
working conditions generally, they need not yield when the im-
provement of working conditions involved is the elimination of
employment discrimination. Furthermore, just because' a particular
minority group organization presses for the elimination of em-
ployment discrimination by seeking recognition from, and bargain-
ing with, an employer, there is no reason to assume that, absent a
Board-conducted election, the minority group organization repre-
sents even a majority of the minority group in the bargaining unit.
Weakening section 8(b)(7) restrictions may result in denying mem-
bers of minority groups free choice in the selection of a bargaining
representative, including the minority group organization estab-
lished to deal with their special interests. Consequently, the crea-
tion of a substantive defense to LMRA union unfair labor practices
is consistent neither with the policies of the LMRA nor Title VII. 140
Similar concerns apply to the radiations from NLRB v. Mansion
139 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1970). See note 135 supra.
140 Of course, if § 704(a) of Title VII were deemed to create an independent right of
self-help protest, harmonizing Title VII and the LMRA might require a narrowing of the
basic prohibitions of § 8(b)(4)(B) and § 8(b)(7).
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House Center Management Corp.,141 which suggest that unions and
employers determined by the Board to have engaged in discrimi-
nation prohibited by Title VII must be denied access to Board
remedial machinery. Aside from difficulties in the constitutional
theory relied on as a predicate for denying access to Board reme-
dial machinery,142 denial of standing to invoke unfair labor prac-
tice proceedings on the part of employers and unions charged with
employment discrimination may not be all that is implied. Al-
though denial of standing presumably would not constitute a
determination that the economic pressure engaged in by a minority
group, otherwise prohibited, was privileged, 43 the difficulties of
administering a denial of standing rule may force the Board into
declaring in particular cases that economic pressure in support of
employment discrimination claims, otherwise prohibited, is
privileged. To minimize opportunity for subterfuge (which is pos-
sible because the availability of the unfair labor practice machinery
to any person could lead employers and unions, themselves denied
standing, to enlist outsiders to file charges on their behalf), the
Board would be required to conduct lengthy prehearing investiga-
tions of all complaining parties when an employment discrimina-
tion issue is raised to determine whether or not those parties
themselves engaged in unlawful discrimination. Prolonging the
already protracted Board proceedings might result in employer
and union capitulation to minority group economic pressure,
thereby effectively depriving them of a remedy to which they
would otherwise be entitled. Dealing with the opportunity for
subterfuge instead by denying standing to all those seeking to enlist
the Board's machinery on behalf of the parties themselves denied
standing but directly the object of minority group economic pres-
sure also comes perilously close to declaring the economic pressure
to be privileged, since only a supremely disinterested party-thus
141 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973). The court refused to enforce the Board's order
requiring the company to recognize a union and bargain with it, and remanded the case to
the Board for the purpose of reopening the record for receipt of proof on the company's
claim that it could not constitutionally be ordered to recognize and bargain with a union
which exhibited racially discriminatory membership practices. The basis for the court's
action was its broad holding that "the remedial machinery of the National Labor Relations
Act cannot be available to a union which is unwilling to correct past practices of racial
discrimination." Id. at 477. For criticism of the court's decision, see Meltzer, supra note 1, at
9-19.
142 See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 9-11.
143 This is so because any person may file an unfair labor practice charge. See Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970). See also Rules and
Regulations of the NLRB, 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1974).
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probably uninterested in participating as well-would theoretically
be permitted to proceed before the Board. Insofar as a denial of
standing rule leads to these consequences, it is not consistent with
the policies of the LMRA or Title VII.
In summary, the interests served by sections 8(b)(4)(B) and
8(b)(7) are just as valid when the working conditions sought to be
improved by the use of economic pressure are claimed to be
discriminatory as when they are alleged to disadvantage workers in
other respects traditionally opposed by labor organizations. Ac-
cordingly, permitting the types of self-help generally prohibited by
sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(b)(7), or denying persons standing to raise
those claims, is not warranted simply because employment dis-
crimination claims have been raised. In a circumstance in which a
relaxation of substantive restrictions might be appropriate, such as
where the prohibition against rival union economic pressure is
dependent on the incumbent's adherence to the duty of fair
representation, deference to the goals of Tide VII and the LMRA
requires that the relaxation depend on proven breach of the fair
representation duty followed by revocation of the offending un-
ion's certification or right to continued recognition, rather than on
a naked allegation of union dereliction of duty.
VI
EXPANDING RIGHTS OF EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVES
TO PROTEST ALLEGED UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION
In Emporium, the dissident employees requested the union to
strike in support of their discrimination claims, but the union
refused, preferring "orderly legal procedures that would have
some long lasting effect." 144 The problem thus arises, in conjunc-
tion with the Court's suggestion that NLRA "rights" may have to be
expanded, concerning the extent to which a union could engage in
economic pressure during the term of its bargaining agreement in
support of discrimination claims without violating the LMRA or a
no-strike obligation in its bargaining agreement.
As noted above, 145 Laborers Local 478 established the principle
that economic pressure directed against the removal or appoint-
ment of a management collective bargaining or grievance handling
representative otherwise in violation of LMRA section 8(b)(1)(B)
144 Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 67 n.19
(1975).
145 See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
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will not be protected by its link to alleged discriminatory practices.
However, the court was careful to note that the case did not
present the question whether section 8(b)(1)(B) prohibits economic
pressure in protest of deliberate selection of a supervisor so im-
bued with racially biased attitudes as to create a discriminatory
condition of employment by his mere presence on the job. 4 6 In the
latter circumstance, the LMRA policy generally disfavoring union
coercion of management bargaining and grievance handling rep-
resentatives might be required to give way to the nondiscrimination
requirement of Title VII, and, although economic pressure di-
rected against continued employment of the supervisor might
contravene a no-strike clause, it might be held not to violate section
8(b)(1)(B).
In addition, the rights conferred by Title VII may require
relaxation of some Board precepts permitting a refusal to bargain
during the term of a bargaining agreement.' 47 It is traditional
Board analysis that good faith bargaining is required with respect
to the subject of appropriate remedies for existing or alleged
discriminatory employment practices.148 Moreover, Board analysis
would not require a finding of a breach of an employer's section
8(a)(5) obligations because of unilateral action changing employ-
ment conditions to eliminate violations of Title VII, even though
the action might be in breach of contract and even though the
employer would be obligated to bargain about a replacement for
the eliminated provision. 14 9
146 503 F.2d at 194 n.3.
147 See Comment, supra note I, at 180-86, in which it is suggested that authority to
regulate good faith bargaining be expanded to permit the Board to dictate the substantive
terms and conditions of labor agreements by prohibiting, as a refusal to bargain in good
faith, the execution and maintenance of contractual provisions deemed to violate Title VII.
148 Packinghouse Workers Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 903 (1969), on remand, 194 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971).
149 See, e.g., Glover Packing Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 547, 551 (1971) (no violation of the good
faith bargaining obligation when the employer unilaterally, without prior bargaining, raised
female wages to eliminate a wage differential prohibited by the Equal Pay Act). Although not
directly deciding the issue, cases validating requirements for affirmative action programs
pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), have suggested that the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance and contract compliance agencies possess authority to require
changes in employment conditions which are deemed to violate federal law prohibiting
discriminatory employment practices by unilateral employer action without the consent of
the bargaining representative or adherence to the obligations imposed by NLRA § 8(a)(5).
Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Ass'n v.
Hodgson, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). See also Leiken,
Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the Philadelphia Plan, 56
CORNELL L. REv. 84 (1970); Coney, Affirmative Action Dents the National Labor Policy, 10
DUQUESNE L. Rv. 1 (1971).
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Nevertheless, suppose that during the term of a collective
bargaining agreement, a labor organization proposes a reopening
of the agreement to eliminate the existing departmental seniority
system, which has traditionally confined blacks or females to de-
partments containing the lowest paying jobs, and to substitute a
plant-wide seniority system incorporating additional special trans-
fer rights and monetary relief for the victims of past discrimination
similar to relief ordered in Title VII cases where departmental
seniority arrangements have been deemed unlawful. 50 The em-
ployer refuses to bargain, citing a conventional "zipper" clause T15 in
the bargaining agreement, the fact that the union had unsuccess-
fully proposed the same idea in the most recent contract negotia-
tions, and Board rulings that in such circumstances an employer
has no midterm bargaining obligation. 152 Yet Gardner-Denver 53
teaches that Title VII rights cannot be waived in the bargaining
process, implying that an employer would not be permitted to
refuse to bargain in this context. A "zipper" clause thus would have
no application to rights that cannot be waived in the bargaining
process, just as the parties to a collective agreement cannot "waive"
section 7 rights of individual employees to solicit and distribute
literature in support of or against an incumbent bargaining rep-
resentative.15 4
Traditional Board analysis dictates that insistence to the point
of impasse in bargaining or striking to compel inclusion of an
illegal provision in a bargaining agreement contravenes the good
faith bargaining obligation. This principle has been most fre-
quently applied when a labor organization seeks to compel inclu-
sion of illegal union security clauses or provisions made unlawful
by section 8(e).155 It follows that the refusal by one party, on
request of the other, to eliminate an illegal contract provision or
150 See, e.g., United States v. National L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 906 (1972); UPP Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
"' The following is an example of a typical "zipper" clause: "'Neither party shall be
obligated to bargain with respect to any subject or matter referred to or covered or not
referred to or not covered in this agreement.'" B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW, CASES MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 686 (1970).
152 See, e.g., Jacobs Mfg., Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (195 1), enforced in part, 196 F.2d 680 (2d
Cir. 1952). See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Mansfield Plant), 150 N.L.R.B. 1574, 1585
(1965).
153 415 U.S. at 51.
154 NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 332 (1974).
'5' See, e.g., NLRB v. Bricklayers Local 5, 378 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1967). See also Douds v.
ILA, 147 F. Supp. 103, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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employment practice, even during the term of a collective agree-
ment, would also violate the good faith bargaining obligation. As a
practical matter, of course, if the union refuses to change an illegal
employment practice, an employer could unilaterally eliminate the
practice without running afoul of its bargaining obligation (unless
it refused to bargain about alternative practices to replace the one
eliminated), and would probably not seek a Board determination of
an 8(b)(3) violation based on the union's conduct.
When the union is seeking, during the term of a bargaining
agreement, to eliminate a contractual provision or employment
practice made illegal by Tide VII, however, the question of the
union's right to utilize unilateral action-or self-help-is more
difficult. Again, consider the example of the discriminatory senior-
ity system. Both sides agree that the existing departmental system is
illegal under Title VII and that the existing system cannot simply
be eliminated without producing chaos in the plant, but they
cannot agree on a substitute. Can the union strike to compel, in
effect, acceptance of its proposal for a substitute seniority ar-
rangement during the term of the collective bargaining agreement?
The starting point for analysis is NLRB v. Lion Oil, 156 although
it involved a somewhat special factual situation. There, the Su-
preme Court determined that where a bargaining agreement did
not contain a no-strike clause and it contemplated reopening for
bargaining purposes, and notice provisions triggering the reopen-
ing of negotiations had been complied with, a strike in support of
demands made in the reopened negotiations would not violate the
notice provisions of section 8(d), the section 8(b)(3) bargaining
obligation, or the collective bargaining agreement. The Court rea-
soned that "[i]t would be anomalous for Congress to recognize...
a [bargaining] duty [during the life of a contract] and at the same
time deprive the union of the strike threat which, together with
'the occasional strike itself, is the force depended upon to facilitate
arriving at satisfactory settlements.' ,,157 In addition to this argu-
ment, Mastro Plastics158 might also support union economic pres-
sure and excuse a protest strike, despite a no-strike clause in the
bargaining agreement, on the theory that the employer's refusal to
eliminate the allegedly discriminatory employment practice and to
156 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
15" Id. at 291, quoting SuBCoMMirr. ON LABOR AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
FACTORS IN SUCCESSFUL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (Comm. Print 1951).
See also, UMW Local 9735 v. NLRB, 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
15 See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
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agree to the union's substitute constituted a serious refusal to
bargain in good faith. 159
There are, however, significant and perhaps overwhelming
counterconsiderations. The predicate for declaring the notice pro-
visions of section 8(d) inapplicable in Lion Oil was that the bar-
gaining agreement's provisions for reopening negotiations there
involved had been fully complied with and the contract was silent
on the question of whether a right to strike existed during reopen-
ing. Where the contract embodying the allegedly discriminatory
employment practice does not contemplate reopening to discuss
such matters, Lion Oil may not sanction a midterm strike in support
of a bargaining position. Moreover, insofar as Lion Oil dealt with a
collective bargaining agreement which did not contain a no-strike
clause, it may extend only to provide a defense to section 8(b)(3)
charges alleging that the union's strike violated its good faith
bargaining obligation and may not vitiate express or implied con-
tractual no-strike obligations. 1 60
The justification for application of Mastro Plastics in this con-
text-that an employer's refusal to agree to the union's proposal to
change an allegedly discriminatory contractual provision or em-
ployment practice is a serious unfair labor practice-is questionable
because of the freedom of contract ideals embodied in section 8(d)
of the LMRA.16. If an employment practice or contractual provi-
sion violates Title VII, courts may order its excision from a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and revisions to eradicate the continuing
effects of past discrimination. 62 Those changes, however, are
ordered only after the tribunal charged with plenary Title VII
enforcement authority has determined that a violation has actually
occurred. Not only would a Mastro Plastics theory require investing
the Board with power to determine whether or not refusing to
agree to particular contract terms constitutes a serious unfair
labor practice, but also it would risk having Board determinations
concerning the legality of union strikes decide the legality of
19 See Comment, supra note 1, at 180-86.
160 Lion Oil was decided prior to the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), and Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S.
368 (1974), which held that in the absence of an express no-strike clause the existence of a
grievance-arbitration provision in a bargaining agreement, by implication, creates a no-strike
obligation coextensive with the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. See Justice Frankfurter's
and Justice Harlan's separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part in Lion Oil,
352 U.S. at 294-305.
6' See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); H. K. Porter Co.
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
162 See cases in note 150 supra.
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certain practices under Title VII prior to a determination of the
Title VII issue in the courts. In other contexts where the authority
to determine the validity of a particular type of clause-such as a
provision creating a health and welfare benefit trust-resides in
another federal agency, the Board has been reluctant to declare
contractual provisions illegal prior to securing a determination
from the tribunal primarily responsible for such matters.1 63 The
same reasoning applies where one party uses Board processes to
compel adoption of a particular contractual provision on the
ground that the provision to be replaced violates Title VII, particu-
larly when the Board determination is essential to excusing a strike
from contractual or statutory prohibitions. Finally, as in the case
where a minority group resorts to self-help, a strike in support of
employment discrimination claims during the term of a bargaining
agreement is inconsistent with the elaborate mechanisms created by
Title VII to channel protest on these matters to law enforcement
tribunals. The delays and consequent frustration created by the
inability of those tribunals to deal with their enormous backlogs
should be remedied by congressional provision of additional re-
sources rather than allowing resort to self-help.
Similar considerations argue against permitting, for section
8(b)(3) as well as for contract purposes, a strike during the term of
a bargaining agreement to compel an employer to eliminate an
illegal discriminatory employment practice for which no replace-
ment provision has been proposed. Although the employer's re-
fusal to eliminate the unlawful practice may well be a violation of
its obligation to bargain in good faith,164 any determination on that
issue would necessarily follow a determination that the contractual
provision or employment practice is in fact illegal. Self-help would,
therefore, constitute an abandonment of the statutory mechanisms
established to resolve employment discrimination claims and al-
leged violations of good faith bargaining obligations. Furthermore,
the serious problems arising from applying the Mastro Plastics
principle to privilege strikes against unfair employment practices
generally165 would be compounded in the context of an unfair
163 In Lumber Workers Local 2647, 130 N.L.R.B. 235 (1961), enforced sub nom. Cheney
California Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1963), the Board, with appellate
court approval, ruled as follows: "In the absence of a determination by an agency charged
with the enforcement of Section 302 that the Respondents' proposal was unlawful, we are
not prepared to say that Respondents' insistence thereon constituted a refusal to bargain in
good faith." 130 N.L.R.B. at 241-42.
164 See text accompanying note 155 supra.
1"1 See note 93 supra.
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labor practice alleging that the refusal to eliminate an illegal
employment practice was a violation of the duty to bargain in good
faith. Although certainly a "serious" matter, such a violation hardly
rivals the unfair labor practices in Mastro Plastics, involving dis-
charges of union leaders and unlawful assistance to a rival labor
organization designed to undermine completely the principle of
collective bargaining.
Thus, although the obligation to bargain during the term of a
collective agreement about the eradication of discriminatory em-
ployment practices can accommodate Tite VII, the expansion of
the good faith bargaining obligation should not extend to permit-
ting a right to strike by a labor organization in support of midterm
demands to eliminate discriminatory employment practices.
CONCLUSION
When prescribing limitations on self-help as a means for
resolving labor disputes, Congress has traditionally provided alter-
native channels for dealing with the causes of unrest. The deplora-
ble case backlogs associated with law enforcement tribunals having
jurisdiction over employment discrimination claims, however, raise
serious problems in connection with the application of a traditional
labor policy framework to workplace civil rights controversies,
exacerbated by the language of Title VII which might be interpreted
to sanction a self-help remedy. Because Title VII's goal of equal
employment opportunity is to be effected, at least in part, by
removing the disposition of employment discrimination claims
from the arena of economic warfare, it has been argued here that,
wholly apart from a determination that the statutory language
need not be interpreted to protect self-help, construing section
704(a) to include a broad right to employ economic pressure is not
warranted, even when a union is alleged to have breached its duty
of fair representation.
Adoption of the limiting construction of section 704(a) advo-
cated here would not by itself solve the problem. The potential
unavailability of LMRA section 301 injunctive relief against minor-
ity group strikes in breach of contract, denying standing to invoke
NLRB remedies when the charging party is alleged to have en-
gaged in practices prohibited by Title VII, and relaxing prohi-
bitions on midterm strikes by unions seeking the elimination of
discriminatory terms and conditions of employment together could
result in a limited independent self-help remedy. Recognition of
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even this limited form of economic pressure would be a significant
departure from traditional labor policy considerations and also
from Title VII's policy of channelling employment discrimination
claims away from economic warfare. Resort to economic self-help
with its attendant complexities should not be inferred from unclear
statutory language, nor should it be sanctioned in the absence of
express congressional approval.
